A time bank is usually regarded as a new form of volunteer service. Focusing on the dimension of non-compensation, we define time banks’ special volunteer service as low-paid volunteer service, to distinguish it from the traditional unpaid volunteer service. In recent years, these two kinds of volunteer services have simultaneously emerged in China's time banks, which we called "hybrid volunteering". And it has a positive impact on the sustainable development of time banks. Based on the multiple institutional logic perspective and case analysis, we find the hybrid volunteering is mainly generated from three mechanisms: Through the division and distribution of voluntary labor reciprocation by time currency, the integration process design of low-paid volunteer service and unpaid volunteer service is realized; The public welfare fund manages the donation of time currency separately, to avoid circulating with time currency from low-paid volunteer service; An exclusive time bank platform is also set up to mobilize party members to participate in unpaid volunteer through grassroots party building, cooperating with a separate public welfare fund to organize party member volunteers independently. In such complex institutional environment, the competition between market logic and public welfare logic may lead to the failure of hybrid volunteering, while the intervention of government logic and performance of the value guidance and resource integration functions of party building can alleviate it.

时间银行通常被视为志愿服务的一种新形式,从无偿性维度可将该特殊志愿服务类型定义为低偿志愿服务,以区别于传统的无偿志愿服务。近些年来,部分中国的时间银行开始出现两类志愿服务兼容的混合形态,也就是 “混合志愿服务”,并对时间银行的可持续运作产生了积极影响。基于多重制度逻辑视角结合案例分析得出,混合志愿服务主要生成于三种机制:通过时间币分割和分配志愿劳动成果,实现了低偿志愿服务和无偿志愿服务的整合流程设计;建立公益基金专门管理捐赠时间币,实现了两类志愿服务时间币流通的管理制度区隔;另设平台结合基层党建动员党员参与,配合独立的公益基金实现了党员参与无偿志愿服务的组织区隔。在复杂的制度环境中,市场逻辑与公益逻辑相互竞争可能会导致混合志愿服务失灵问题,而政府逻辑的介入以及党建的价值引领与资源整合功能的发挥可以对其进行缓解。