How to explain the avoid responsibility phenomenon of street bureaucrats in regulatory environment : "The less they do, the less likely they are to make mistakes"? Deterrence theory holds that certainty and severity are two paths for supervision, and capture can reduce policy effect by adjusting both strategies. To clarify how capture affects regulatory performance, this paper constructs a "risk-behavior" analysis framework and utilizes environmental governance data for empirical testing. This paper uses the dynamic panel data to determine causality, and the study found that the degree of capture only has a weakened regulatory effect on the severity of the impact, while certainty no longer has the policy effect of reducing pollution. In order to clarify the mechanism of causality, this article uses the “theoretical least-likely case” for its supplementary analysis. In the case the level of capture is low, after being caught, law enforcement officials will prioritize to control certainty. Thus, certainty becomes invalid. As the degree of capture increases, this preference would become more apparent. Perception of risk is the core factor that determines the behavior of both parties of the capture. To maintain the stability of the transaction structure, when enterprises choose to reduce risks by reducing emissions, severity is still an effective regulatory tool. When enterprises choose to reduce risks by increasing the level of capture, severity no longer works. This paper demonstrates the mechanism of how capture makes heavy pollution control ineffective and its consequences. It provides theoretical guidance for improving the efficiency of environmental supervision, especially improving the efficiency of environmental inspectors.

如何解释基层环境执法者在环境执法中的 “少做少错、不做不错”等避责现象及执法效果? 威慑理论认为,确定性和严厉性是有效监管的两种路径,俘获可以通过调节确定性和严厉性来降低政策效果。为了理清俘获如何影响环境监管效果,文章构造了 “风险 行为”的分析框架,并利用环境治理数据进行实证检验。文章利用动态面板数据来识别因果效应,研究发现:俘获程度仅仅对严厉性的效果产生削弱型的调节作用,确定性不具有降低污染的政策效果。为了理清因果机制,文章运用 “理论最不可能案例”进行补充分析:当俘获程度较低时,被俘获后的执法者会优先选择操纵确定性,确定性因此失效,随着俘获程度的提高,这种优先选择倾向会更加明显。风险感知是决定俘获双方行为的核心因素。为了维持交易结构的稳定,当企业选择以削减排污的方式降低风险时,严厉性依然是有效的监管政策;当企业选择以提高俘获程度的方式降低风险时,严厉性则不再有效。文章论证了俘获如何使重典治污失效的发生机制及其后果,为提高环境治理绩效,特别是提高环保督察的效率提供有益思路。

"> 环境监管, 俘获, 确定性, 严厉性