Since the establishment of rural collective ownership in the late 1950s, rural land appreciation income sharing has gradually shifted to the negotiation, communication and transaction during farmers, community (collectives), local government and central government, with multiple subjects participating in benefit sharing. In this process, what benefits did collectives gain? What is the basis of property rights for collectives to acquire appreciation income sharing? The existing research on the reform of the rural property rights system mostly stays at the static level, which lacks a dynamic analysis of the system’s formation and transformation process within the group. In addition, the existing studies have not combed and summarized the land appreciation income sharing rules changes in the process of rural land system reform from the macro level, lacking focus on the special subject of collectives. However, in sharp contrast to the weak academic research is the huge amount of land appreciation income generated in the process of industrialization and urbanization caused more and more social conflicts. In recent years, emerging economic theories such as behavioral economics believe that individual cognition is an important internal source of the system, and advocate understanding the process of system change from the perspective of individual cognition. Therefore, this study firstly attempts to combine heterogeneous individual cognition with rule change, constructing a multi-level dynamic evolution analysis framework from individual cognition to the external rules with evolutionary thinking. Secondly, this study analyzes the institutional change process of land appreciation income sharing system, which combines with the land system reform practice in China. The results show that collectives and peasants play important roles in the evolution process, because under the external environment, their individual cognition forms the internal rules based on their own interests. The government’s selective acceptance and "promising" design have facilitated the harmonious interaction between external rules and internal rules and formed institutional changes. In general, the appreciation income share is gradually inclined to the peasants. And in this process, the identity of collective becomes more diversified, not only the owner of land, but also providing service and gaming with government. At the same time, the source of appreciation income becoming more abundant. In terms of future trends, institutional change requires the change in the external environment as an opportunity to stimulate the expression of individual cognition, and institutional changes will evolve toward improving rights and increasing income of collective and peasant. However, not all internal rules will be converted into external rules. Only under the premise of not threatening the urban land market and guaranteeing the interests of the government, the government will coordinate external rules, gradually decentralize and make profits, and finally realize institutional changes.

农村土地收益分成制度变迁的动力源于基层实践和政府推动,表现出经济学意义上的演化特征。本文从当事人的个体认知出发,采用演化思想,构建从个体认知到外部规则的涵盖微观中观 宏观的多层次动态演化分析框架,结合土地非农利用方面的制度改革实践,对土地收益分成制度变迁过程进行了分析。结果表明,农民在演化过程中扮演了重要角色,他们的个体认知 (微观层面)形成了制度变迁的起点,在外部环境的作用下基于其自身利益在中观层面———集体内部形成“内部规则”,政府在此过程中的选择性接纳和 “有为”设计,促成了外部规则与内部规则的协调互动,最终形成宏观层面的制度变迁。总体来看,收益分成逐渐向农民倾斜,集体作为特殊的当事人,在此过程中其收益来源发生了转变,从最根本的所有者权益到使用者权益再到通过提供经营、服务获得收益及博弈获得了更多收益,参与收益分成的方式更为丰富。在未来趋势方面,制度变迁需要外部环境的变化作为契机,才能刺激个体认知的表达,会向着完善集体和农民权利以及增加其收益的方向演进,形成内部规则,集体产权也更加明晰。但并非所有的内部规则都会转为外部规则,只有在不威胁城市土地市场和保证政府利益的前提下,政府才会协调外部规则,逐渐放权让利,最终实现制度变迁。