The vitality of a policy lies in its implementation. In the rural society based on "relationship", village cadres with substantial discretion often adopt an informal "relationship governance" model to implement policies, and realize the constraint and incentive of each other's behavior through interpersonal emotional connection and reciprocal obligation. This study takes the grass-roots implementation of the river chief system policy as an example. By introducing the interactive adaptation theory of policy implementation, an executive model including human relationship, individual ability and service motivation is constructed. By using a total of 961 survey data collected by the research group in Jiangsu, Anhui and Shaanxi provinces, the comprehensive impact of relationship governance on the policy implementation ability of village cadres is empirically investigated. The results show that: Relationship governance will lead to the improvement of public acceptance of policies and the reduction of implementers' compliance with policies. Under the joint action of the two forces, there is an "inverted U-shaped" relationship between the degree of relationship governance and the policy implementation ability of village cadres. On the one hand, public leadership can enhance policy implementation, on the other hand, it can buffer the negative impact of relationship governance, and play a positive mediating role in the impact of relationship governance on policy implementation. Public service motivation is the boundary condition to improve public policy implementation. When village cadres have a higher level of public service motivation, the negative impact of relationship governance on policy implementation is weakened. Combined with the special situation of rural social field, this study expands the theory of policy implementation in the Chinese context, and can provide policy reference and theoretical guidance for the grass-roots policy implementation.

政策的生命力在于执行。在以 “关系”为本位的农村社会,具有实质裁量权的村干部往往会采取一种非正式的 “关系治理”模式来执行政策,通过人际间的情感联系和互惠义务实现彼此行为的约束和激励。本研究以河长制政策的基层执行为例,通过引入政策执行的互动调适理论,构建了一个纳入人情关系、个体能力以及服务动机在内的执行力模型,利用课题组在江苏、安徽、陕西三省共961份调研数据,实证考察关系治理对村干部政策执行力的综合影响。研究发现:关系治理会导致公众对政策接受度的提高和执行者对政策遵从度的降低,在两种力量共同作用下,关系治理的程度与村干部政策执行力之间呈现出 “倒 U形”关系;公共领导力一方面对政策执行力有提升作用,另一方面也能缓冲关系治理的负面影响,在关系治理对政策执行力的影响中发挥正向中介作用;公共服务动机是提高公共政策执行力的边界条件,当村干部具有较高水平的公共服务动机时,关系治理对政策执行力的负面影响被弱化。本研究结合乡土社会场域的特殊情境,拓展了中国情景下的政策执行理论,能够为基层政策执行提供政策参考和理论指引。