The rapid economic growth in the past forty years of reform and opening up has attracted academic attention to the proactive entrepreneurial behavior of local governments. However,in recent years, the economic growth rate has slowed down, and local entrepreneurial enthusiasm has weakened. Under China??s unique institutional incentives, the behavior of local governments presents a phased “back-and-forth” phenomenon of proactivity and passivity. This requires not only an explanation of the previous rapid growth and proactive behavior but also an explanation of the recent slowdown in growth and passive avoidance of responsibility, and a return to the normative behavior of high-quality development. Research on local behavioral incentives is mostly synchronic,which helps to grasp the key mechanisms and logic but should consider its historical continuity. This paper takes the evolution logic of residual power control as a clue, sorts out the central control of local residual power in different stages, and reveals the implicit temporality between the transformation of local government behavior incentives and high-quality development. It constructs an innovative incentive mechanism for high-quality development, namely, the relaxation of residual power control under accountability adjustment. It is proposed that in the new era, effective incentives for local behavior need to coordinate the relationship between “relaxing control” and “tightening control”,realize the “institutionalization of residual power control” and “rebalancing of autonomy” to promote high-quality development. Although the perspective of residual power control is not sufficient to cover all the complex situations of local government behavior since the founding of New China,it helps to connect and answer the logical consistency between central residual power incentives and local behavior changes in the reform process. This paper provides an analytical framework that comprehensively reflects the transformation of local government behavior incentives to adapt to the needs of high-quality development, providing insights and exploratory evidence for understanding the direction of central-local interaction reform.

改革开放40多年的经济高速增长引起了学界对地方政府过往积极干事创业行为的关注,但近年来经济增速放缓,地方创业热情减弱。在中国独特的制度激励下,地方政府行为呈现阶段性的积极与消极“反复横跳”现象。这既需要解释曾经的高速增长与积极行为,也需要解释近年的增速放缓与消极避责,并再次转向高质量发展的规范行为。关于地方行为激励的研究多为共时性的,虽有助于把握关键机制与逻辑,但应考虑其历史延续性。本文以剩余权管制的演进逻辑为线索,通过梳理不同阶段中央对地方剩余权管制过程,揭示地方政府行为激励变革与高质量发展之间暗含的时序性。构建了高质量发展的创新激励机制,即问责调适下的剩余权放松管制。提出新时代对地方行为实施有效激励需协调“放松管制”和“紧缩管制”的关系,实现“剩余权管制制度化”与“自主性”再平衡,以推进实现高质量发展。剩余权管制视角虽不足以涵盖新中国成立以来地方政府行为的所有复杂情况,但有助于串联和解答改革进程中中央剩余权激励与地方行为转变之间的逻辑一致性。本文提供了一个全面反映地方政府行为激励变革适应高质量发展需求的分析框架,为理解央地互动改革方向提供观点启示与探索证据。