Among the many explanations for China's rapid economic growth, fiscal decentralization, a institutional factor, has received long-term attention from academia since the late 1980s. How to objectively understand the institutional changes of fiscal decentralization in China? It is undoubtedly of great significance to sort out the issues of "what" and "how" about this system. This paper draws on the research paradigm of Historical Institutionalism and based on China's fiscal system itself to explore the institutional changes of fiscal decentralization in China. The findings are as follows, China's fiscal decentralization can be divided into four stages: the decentralization reform stage (1949-1978), the decentralization and concession reform stage (1979-1993), the tax distribution reform stage (1994-2012), and the modern fiscal and tax system reform stage (2013-present); China's fiscal decentralization has the legitimacy of institutional generation, and also exhibits the integrity of path dependence, the stability of fractured equilibrium, and the inclusiveness of gradual transformation; the localization of interests promoted by China's fiscal decentralization has shown significant positive incentives in supporting national governance, achieving common prosperity, improving social security, and coping with public crises. At the same time, we should also see the moral hazard problems induced by the localization of interests, especially the frequent occurrence of resource mismatch and waste caused by information asymmetry and insufficient capacity, as well as the negative impact of improper fiscal competition that has made intergovernmental collaboration and regulation more difficult. This paper provides an analytical framework for institutional change from the perspective of change process, change logic to institutional effectiveness, which provides ideas and enlightenment for interpreting the evolution of central and local fiscal relations and rationalizing China's fiscal system in the new era.

在关于中国高速经济增长的诸多解释中,财政分权这一制度因素从20世纪80年代末期以来长期受到学界的关注。如何客观理解中国财政分权的制度变迁? 对这一制度进行 “是什么”“怎么样”等问题的梳理,无疑是意义重大的。本文借鉴历史制度主义的研究范式,立足中国财政制度本身,探讨中国财政分权的制度变迁。研究发现,中国财政分权可划分为权力下放改革阶段 (1949—1978年)、放权让利改革阶段 (1979—1993年)、分税制改革阶段 (1994—2012年)和现代财税体制改革阶段 (2013年至今);中国财政分权具备制度生成的合法性,又表现出路径依赖的完整性、断裂平衡的稳定性和渐进转型的包容性;中国财政分权推动的利益地方化在支撑国家治理、实现共同富裕、完善社会保障、应对公共危机层面带有正向激励,与此同时,也要看到利益地方化诱发的道德风险问题,特别是信息不对称和能力不足导致的资源错配和浪费现象频现,以及不当的财政竞争致使府际协同和调控难度加大的负面影响。本文提供了一个从变迁历程、变迁逻辑到制度效能的制度变迁分析框架,为解读中央和地方财政关系演化、理顺新时代中国财政体系提供思路和启示。