The land supervision institution, a significant institutional innovation in land management, regulates local government land concessions by tightening institutional restrictions on land usage, so as to limit the scope of land transaction. Taking the routine land supervision institution as a quasi-natural experiment as well as using a multi-period DID method with panel data from 281 prefecture-level cities in China, this study empirically explores the long-term and short-term restraining impacts of routine land supervision institution on the amount of land transaction by local governments and the corresponding impact mechanisms. The empirical findings demonstrate: (1) that land supervision institution can significantly reduce the extent of land transaction, and that this conclusion is highly robust;(2) the suppressive effect of routine land supervision on the scale of land transaction has a long-term sustainable effect; (3) the routine land supervision is to enhance the advanced level of industrial structure, thus eliminating the scale of local government land transaction; (4) routine land supervision has a significant resident effect, with the scale of land transaction in the residential areas of the land Inspectorate significantly reduced compared to non-resident areas; (5) there is regional heterogeneity in the inhibitory effect of routine land inspectors, with the strongest policy effect in the eastern region, followed by the central region, and no effect in the western region. Finally, this study proposes policy recommendations such as increasing the implementation of routine land supervision institution, promoting the coordination between routine land supervision institution policies and industrial policies, strengthening the power and functions of land inspector bureaus, and focusing on regional differences in the effects of routine land supervision institution.

"> Routine Land Supervision, Land Transaction, Industrial , Structure, Government Station Effect, Influence Mechanism