The land supervision institution, a significant institutional innovation in land management, regulates local government land concessions by tightening institutional restrictions on land usage, so as to limit the scope of land transaction. Taking the routine land supervision institution as a quasi-natural experiment as well as using a multi-period DID method with panel data from 281 prefecture-level cities in China, this study empirically explores the long-term and short-term restraining impacts of routine land supervision institution on the amount of land transaction by local governments and the corresponding impact mechanisms. The empirical findings demonstrate: (1) that land supervision institution can significantly reduce the extent of land transaction, and that this conclusion is highly robust;(2) the suppressive effect of routine land supervision on the scale of land transaction has a long-term sustainable effect; (3) the routine land supervision is to enhance the advanced level of industrial structure, thus eliminating the scale of local government land transaction; (4) routine land supervision has a significant resident effect, with the scale of land transaction in the residential areas of the land Inspectorate significantly reduced compared to non-resident areas; (5) there is regional heterogeneity in the inhibitory effect of routine land inspectors, with the strongest policy effect in the eastern region, followed by the central region, and no effect in the western region. Finally, this study proposes policy recommendations such as increasing the implementation of routine land supervision institution, promoting the coordination between routine land supervision institution policies and industrial policies, strengthening the power and functions of land inspector bureaus, and focusing on regional differences in the effects of routine land supervision institution.

"> Routine Land Supervision, Land Transaction, Industrial , Structure, Government Station Effect, Influence Mechanism

作为土地管理的一项重要制度创新,土地督察制度通过硬化土地利用的制度约束,规范地方政府土地出让,从而限制土地出让规模。本研究以土地例行督察政策为准自然实验,采用中国281个地级市的面板数据,运用多期DID方法实证检验了土地例行督察对地方政府土地出让规模的长短期抑制效应及作用机制。实证结果显示:(1)土地例行督察能够有效遏制土地出让规模,且此结论具有较强的稳健性;(2)土地例行督察对土地出让规模的抑制作用长期持续且稳定;(3)土地例行督察通过提升产业结构高级化水平,从而消减了地方政府土地出让规模;(4)被督察地区的主政官员是异地莅任,以及被督察地区的财政透明度越高,则土地例行督察对地方政府土地出让规模的抑制效果越优;(5)土地例行督察具有显著的驻地效应,土地督察局驻地地区的土地出让规模比非驻地地区显著减少; (6)土地例行督察的抑制效应存在区域异质性,在东部地区政策效应最强,中部地区次之,西部地区没有影响。最后,本研究提出了加大土地例行督察的实施力度、促进土地例行督察政策与产业政策的协调、强化土地督察局权力和职能、注重土地例行督察效应的区域差异等政策建议。