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Table of Content

    17 May 2024, Volume 13 Issue 3
    Performance Goals, Official Characteristics, and Local Government Investment Preferences in PPP Projects 
    WANG Xuejun, YU Haoran
    2024, 13(3):  3. 
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    The PPP is a new way of public service provision, and in the process of application in China, the distribution of PPP projects shows structural imbalance characteristics, with the number of economic PPP projects significantly more than social PPP projects. Based on the political incentive perspective, this study selects PPP projects initiated by local governments from 2014-2019 in Wind database for empirical analysis to explore the influence of local government performance goals and officials' characteristics on investment preferences of PPP projects at the micro level. The results of the study show that performance goals have a significant negative effect on investment preferences for social PPP projects, and official tenure has a positive relationship with investment preferences for social PPP projects. Official characteristics play a moderating role between performance goals and PPP project investment preferences, i.e., the negative effect of performance goals on social PPP project preferences gradually diminishes as officials' age and tenure increase. This study enriches and expands the research related to how internal and external incentives of officials affect local public service provision, enriching and expanding the research related to how internal and external incentives of officials affect local public service provision, while confirming the limitation of the traditional promotion tournament theory.
    Public Concerns and Policy Representation: An Analysis of Administrative #br# #br# Policies in China from Attention Perspective#br#
    Qin Xiaolei, Li Ning, XUE Huiling, HUANG Jing
    2024, 13(3):  21. 
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    This article focuses on the policy representation of Chinese government. It endeavors to examine the way Chinese government responds to the Public from the perspective of attention allocation. To do so, we drawn data from China's State Council Gazette (2011-2020) and built a dataset consisted of 21 policy topics. The analysis shows that: a) The government is significantly more responsive on issues associated with the Public's livelihood (such as health, education, community and housing) than on other issues. b) There is a lagged effect in the policy response to the public concerns on the agricultural issues. c) There are both spillover effect and trade-off effect regarding to the government's attention allocation. These findings are consistent with the previous scholars’ research and enrich the research of policy representation in China from an attention allocation perspective.
    Heterogeneous Social Feedback,Differential Response and Government #br# #br# Environmental Governance#br#
    TANG Yu, LIU Zhe, WANG Ziyu
    2024, 13(3):  38. 
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    In the process of promoting ecological civilization construction and implementing resource environmental protection,whether bottom-up social feedback plays an important role,and how local governments respond to public environmental appeals has attracted much attention. Based on provincial panel data from 2011 to 2020,the paper explores the impact of environmental social feedback on regional pollution emission,and constructs a "signal-constraint-response" model to further investigate why local governments respond differently to heterogeneous social feedback. This paper found that pollutant emissions in various regions showed a downward trend year by year,and social feedback was negatively correlated with regional pollutant emissions,that is,environmental social feedback can release certain signals and pressures to urge government responses. The subdivision of social feedback and governance tasks revealed that when local governments respond to environmental social feedback,they prefer to respond to strong-signal social feedback with outstanding signal effects,and to respond to explicit performance tasks with outstanding performance characteristics. Further analysis found that due to the scarcity of attention resources,and the resulting competition and allocation of attention,the differential response of local governments is a rational choice after comprehensive consideration. We believes that in order to improve the performance of environmental governance,government departments should further balance their response to different types of social feedback,balance the explicit performance and implicit performance governance in the field of environmental governance,and give full play to the coordination effect of environmental participation and government regulation.The research provides an important reference for understanding the social feedback performance and the form of government response from the perspective of environmental governance,and also makes certain contributions to the research Chinese environmental governance system.
    Why Disciplining Officials with Technology is Popular with Local Government Officials?——A Case Study of Environmental Mobile Law Enforcement System in L City, S Province#br#
    SUN Yu
    2024, 13(3):  54. 
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    Technology is an important tool which is used by the superior government to supervise and control local officials. However, it is popular with local officials. This paper focus on environmental mobile law enforcement system in L City S Province to explain the logic behind this strange attitude. We find that the initial motivation of many local officials is good. The reason why they don’t comply with the formal regulations of the organization is mainly due to the influence of complex social relations and bureaucratic relations. ‘Disciplining officials with technology’ provides a good opportunity for local officials. They use technology to resist relationships in order to achieve the purpose of self-protection. This paper holds that whether technology can resist the relationship depends on the technical hardness and the strength of the relationship. Different technical hardness and relationship strength may induce local officials to make  different behavioral strategy choices.
    How does central environmental protection inspection affect air pollution governance?—— New evidence from the daily panel data of 337 cities in China#br#
    ZHANG Zhenhua ZHAO Mingcheng FENG Yanchao
    2024, 13(3):  71. 
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    The central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) system is an innovative institutional arrangement in China's environmental supervision mechanism. It is of great practical significance to explore its air pollution control effect. Using the daily panel data of 337 cities in China from October 1, 2015 to December 31, 2019, this paper empirically tests the improvement of urban air quality by the first round of CEPI and the “look-back” policy using a two-way fixed effect model. The results show that both the first round of CEPI and the “look-back” policy can significantly improve the air quality in the supervised areas on the whole, but their improvement effects on different pollutants show heterogeneity. The first round of CEPI has strong sustainability and can improve air quality for a long time, but the “look-back” policy does not have the effect of long-term pollution control, and objectively there is a certain phenomenon of “retaliatory pollution”. These two policies have different treatment effects on different pollutants, and have significant regional heterogeneity. The control effect of CEPI on air pollution is regulated by human capital, technological innovation and industrial structure, showing strong heterogeneity. This study has certain theoretical value and guiding significance for further improving the system design of the CEPI and improving the effect of air pollution governance.
    Policy Effects and Impact Mechanisms of China's Routine Land Supervision on Local Governments’ Land Transaction: A Quasi-experimental Study based on the Perspective of Routine Land Supervision#br#
    LIU Jia, ZHU Shan, PENG Jia
    2024, 13(3):  93. 
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    The land supervision institution, a significant institutional innovation in land management, regulates local government land concessions by tightening institutional restrictions on land usage, so as to limit the scope of land transaction. Taking the routine land supervision institution as a quasi-natural experiment as well as using a multi-period DID method with panel data from 281 prefecture-level cities in China, this study empirically explores the long-term and short-term restraining impacts of routine land supervision institution on the amount of land transaction by local governments and the corresponding impact mechanisms. The empirical findings demonstrate: (1) that land supervision institution can significantly reduce the extent of land transaction, and that this conclusion is highly robust;(2) the suppressive effect of routine land supervision on the scale of land transaction has a long-term sustainable effect; (3) the routine land supervision is to enhance the advanced level of industrial structure, thus eliminating the scale of local government land transaction; (4) routine land supervision has a significant resident effect, with the scale of land transaction in the residential areas of the land Inspectorate significantly reduced compared to non-resident areas; (5) there is regional heterogeneity in the inhibitory effect of routine land inspectors, with the strongest policy effect in the eastern region, followed by the central region, and no effect in the western region. Finally, this study proposes policy recommendations such as increasing the implementation of routine land supervision institution, promoting the coordination between routine land supervision institution policies and industrial policies, strengthening the power and functions of land inspector bureaus, and focusing on regional differences in the effects of routine land supervision institution.
    The choice of local government behavior under the normalization of central inspection: Empirical Evidence from the Normalization of Central Environmental Protection Inspectors#br#
    YANG Jiankun
    2024, 13(3):  116. 
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    As an institutional provision to promote the modernization of national governance, central environmental inspectors have gradually become normalized and are influencing the behavior and governance practices of local governments. There is still a lack of relevant empirical research on what kind of environmental behavior local governments exhibit under such normalized central environmental protection inspectors. This paper uses panel data for 287 prefectural-level cities in China from 2014 to 2020, and considers the establishment of the "six regional environmental protection inspectorates" in 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment of normalized environmental protection inspectors. The above questions were answered empirically. It was found that (1) although normalized central environmental protection inspectors push local governments to allocate more attention resources to environmental protection tasks, local governments adopt symbolic environmental protection behavior and selective environmental protection behavior under such normalized central environmental protection inspectors. Local governments neither take stricter punitive measures against non-compliant subjects, nor actively manage those pollutants that are not assessed by regular central inspectors; (2) the deterrent effect of regional environmental protection inspectorates has an obvious distance decay effect. When the distance from the local government to the regional environmental protection inspectorate to which it belongs is less than 200 km, the local government will converge on symbolic environmental behavior, yet selective environmental behavior will become more and more pronounced as the distance from the local government to the regional environmental protection inspectorate increases. This is due to the cost of environmental regulation caused by geographic distance; (3) the central government's financial support to local governments is most helpful for the regional environmental inspectorates to play a regular regulatory role, while the central government's personnel support and public participation can also compensate to some extent for the lack of a regular central environmental inspection system. The article portrays the behavioral choices of local governments under central supervision, which in turn provides empirical evidence for clarifying the effectiveness of the standing central environmental inspection system and policy insights for improving the design of the standing central environmental inspection system. 
    An Evaluation Framework for Urban Safety Resilience in the Context of New Security Pattern: Exploration and Construction#br#
    ZHU Zhengwei, GUO Ruilian, YUAN Ling
    2024, 13(3):  138. 
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    As a new paradigm of urban development, safety resilient city is an important dynamic field to accelerate the modernization of China's system and capacity for security. Under the strategic guidance of "ensuring a new development pattern with a new security pattern", the practical demand for evaluating urban safety resilience is becoming increasingly urgent. However, the existing evaluation systems for urban resilience and urban safety resilience in China cannot meet the current needs for evaluating urban safety resilience due to relatively insufficient theoretical research and low fit between indicator design and actual conditions. Based on the new development stage, this paper proposes a three-dimensional resilience perspective and constructs a forward-looking, guiding, and directional evaluation framework for urban safety resilience. It emphasizes that the evaluation of structural resilience should focus on the system of centralized and unified leadership of the CPC and the system of multi-subject collaborative governance; the evaluation of functional resilience should focus on mechanisms of coordinating development and security, integration of engineering projects and non-engineering measures, conversion from conventional governance to emergency management, informational correction and organizational learning; the evaluation of guaranteed resilience should focus on the optimization of resource allocation, the empowerment of digital technology and the guarantee of law regulations. This framework is intended to provide theoretical bases and management tools for the evaluation of safety resilient city, which is conducive to the security for high-quality development and achieve the safety and transformation of economic and social development.
    Predicting the Diffusion Logic of the Cadre Fault-tolerant Mechanism: Efficiency, Legitimacy, and Leadership——Predictive Modeling Based on Machine Learning#br#
    LIU Zhanyu, YU Yang, LEI Yuqiong
    2024, 13(3):  152. 
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    The national government has been increasingly vocal about the cadre fault-tolerant mechanism (CFTM), however, the spread of this policy in China has gradually slowed down in recent years. To solve the above problems, the key is to study the diffusion logic of CFTM. In the research on the diffusion logic of policy innovation, most research methods generally follow the "within-sample explanation" approach. This makes it difficult to ensure the scientific validity, especially the generalizability, of the research conclusions. To overcome this limitation, this paper adopts the "out-of-sample prediction" approach to explore the diffusion logic of CFTM. Specifically, based on the policy innovation diffusion theory, this paper constructs an analytical framework, uses machine learning methods to train a predictive model for local governments adopting CFTM, and presents the diffusion logic of CFTM while ensuring the predictive performance of the model. The model interpretation results reveal that the diffusion of CFTM is mainly dominated by actor logic, followed by efficiency logic and legitimacy logic. . Among the three dimensions of efficiency logic, legitimacy logic, and actor logic, the most influential features are governance scale, peer adoption, and the tenure of the top leader, respectively. The probability of local governments adopting CFTM is negatively related to governance scale, positively related to peer adoption, and has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the tenure of the top leader. To promote the orderly development of CFTM, this paper suggests that local governments strengthen the leadership-driven effect in the diffusion of CFTM and scientifically plan the diffusion path of CFTM.