Budget Performance Management, as a new field in the modernization of China's governance capabilities in financial governance, is an important component in building a modern fiscal system in the new era. This paper takes the 2021 educational budget fund allocation results of secondary vocational schools in Z Province as a research sample to explore the mechanism of performance information in local government budget decision-making in China, and examines the extent to which different levels of government utilize performance information. The empirical results show: (1) The budget decision-making logic of performance information is consistent with the dialogue theory. That is, performance information can influence government budget decisions, but it is not the only source of information. (2) There is a clear heterogeneity in the use of performance information by different levels of government: compared to district and county governments, the provincial government's use of performance information is more in-depth. That is, the higher the level of government, the more it prefers to use performance information to address the information asymmetry problem in budget allocation, and to exert the reward and punishment function of performance budgeting; whereas grassroots governments are more inclined to balance and compensate for shortcomings, and the concept of performance budget decision-making has not been realized.

预算绩效管理作为我国治理能力现代化的财政治理新领域,是新时期构建现代财政体制的重要组成部门。本文以2021年度Z省中职院校教育预算资金分配结果为研究样本,探讨绩效信息在中国地方政府预算决策中的作用机理,并检验了不同层级的政府对于绩效信息的利用程度。实证结果显示:(1)绩效信息的预算决策逻辑符合对话理论,即绩效信息能够影响政府预算决策,但并不是唯一的信息来源。(2)不同层级的政府对于绩效信息的利用呈现出明显的异质性:相比于区县政府,省级政府对绩效信息的利用程度更加深入。层级越高的政府越偏好利用绩效信息以解决其预算分配信息不对称问题,发挥绩效预算的奖惩功能;而基层政府则更加期望均衡化补短,绩效预算决策理念并没有兑现。