Policy implementation fluctuation is a common phenomenon in local government. Existing studies have explained this phenomenon based on the perspective of institutional environment and section operations, but few to analyze how the changes of implementation pressure at the policy-making level affect the policy implementation. Opening this black box can help to understand policy implementation fluctuation at a deeper level. This paper takes the “physical fitness testing” reform implemented by the General Administration of Sports of China in 2019-2020 as an example, to analyze the process and mechanisms of the fluctuation at different reform stages. The study finds that policy makers shaped implementation situations with different pressure intensities through the mechanisms of mobilization, administrative control and social absorption. And implementers strategically implemented policies with self-interest motives, political tasks and policy goals as the guides of action. Further analysis reveals that: (1)Conflicting goals, insufficient incentives and constraints, as well as competition among local governments lead to negative policy implementation; (2)Under the strong incentive and hard constraint of “one-vote veto”, the unconventional means to accomplish political tasks and avoid accountability risks lead to campaign implementation; (3)Public opinion corrects the campaign-style implementation by reconciling the pressure intensity, and lead the policy to normal implementation. The above findings provide a new perspective for deciphering the deep logic of policy implementation fluctuations and throw light on the effective measures of policy implementation.

执行压力变化引起政策执行波动已是学界共识,但执行压力变化的原因机制尚不清晰,打开这一黑箱有助于深层次理解政策执行波动。本文以2019—2020年国家体育总局推行的 “体能测试”政策为例,结合政策文本和深度访谈,以执行压力的变化为线索,基于执行者视角分析不同阶段执行压力与执行策略互动变化的过程机制与内在逻辑。研究发现,决策者通过号召动员机制、行政控制机制与社会吸纳机制塑造了不同压力强度的执行情境,执行者在变化的执行压力中分别以自利动机、政治任务与政策目标为行动导向,策略性地执行政策。进一步的分析发现,目标冲突、激励与约束不足以及地方政府间竞争使追逐短期利益成为理性选择,政策出现消极执行;在 “一票否决”的强激励与硬约束下,完成政治任务和规避问责风险的非常规手段,助推政策走向运动式执行;公众舆论通过调和压力强度对运动式执行进行纠偏,使政策目标重新引导政策常态化执行。以上发现从竞技体育领域拓展和深化了政策执行波动的相关研究。