The empirical research on the relationship between government transparency and government service level in China is an important research blank. Therefore， this study takes the information asymmetry caused by principal-agent relationship as the entry point， combines the theories of integrity of government and discretion of local government in the Context of China， and proposed the hypothesis of the influence characteristics of government transparency on the improvement of government services under different conditions. Then， taking enterprise services of local governments as an example， panel data of 292 Cities in China from 2017 to 2019 are used as research data， and econometric models such as panel data regression and threshold regression are used to explore the impact of government transparency on government service level and the threshold effect of government transparency， government integrity and local government autonomy. The results of empirical analysis show that the improvement of government transparency significantly promotes the improvement of government service level; In the areas with high degree of government transparency， integrity and local government autonomy， this promotion effect is more obvious; the reverse is less obvious. At the same time， the above conclusions are always valid in the eastern region; In the central region， the threshold effect of government autonomy is still obvious， the threshold effect of transparency is not obvious， but the threshold effect of integrity is different. When the autonomy of government in northeast China is low， the result is contrary to the hypothesis， neither the effect of transparency nor integrity is obvious. In the western region， the threshold effect of transparency， integrity and autonomy is not obvious. Therefore， it can be speculated that under the background of the reform of "delegating regulation and providing services"， the improvement of local government service level has reached a certain height， and the further optimization of services has put forward higher requirements for the governance and innovation capabilities of local governments. The government transparency construction， anti-corruption and decentralization measures can only play a supporting role.

以中国为背景的政府透明度与政府服务水平关系的实证研究是重要的研究空白。因此,本研究以委托 代理关系导致的信息不对称为切入点,结合中国情境下的政府廉洁度、地方政府自主性等理论,提出不同条件下政府透明对政府服务提升影响特征的假设;随后以地方政府的企业服务为例,以中国292个城市2017—2019年的面板数据为研究数据,借助面板数据回归、门槛回归等计量经济模型探究政府透明度对政府服务水平的影响和政府透明度、政府廉洁度、地方政府自主性在其中的门槛效应。实证分析的结果表明,政府透明度的提高显著促进了政府服务水平的提升;在政府透明度高、政府廉洁度高和地方政府自主性高的地区,这一促进作用更为明显;反之则不那么明显。同时,在东部地区以上结论始终成立;在中部地区政府自主性的门槛效应依然明显,透明度的门槛效应不明显,廉洁度的门槛效应则呈现不同的特征;在东北地区政府自主性低时,呈现与假设相反的结果,透明度和廉洁度的门槛效应都不明显;在西部地区透明度、廉洁度与自主性的门槛效应均不明显。由此推测,在 “放管服”改革的大背景下,地方政府服务水平的提升已经达到了一定高度,服务的进一步优化对地方政府治理能力和创新能力提出了更高的要求;而政府透明化建设、反腐败和放权等措施只能在其中起到辅助性作用。