"> 环境监管, 俘获, 确定性, 严厉性

How to explain the avoid responsibility phenomenon of street bureaucrats in regulatory environment : "The less they do, the less likely they are to make mistakes"? Deterrence theory holds that certainty and severity are two paths for supervision, and capture can reduce policy effect by adjusting both strategies. To clarify how capture affects regulatory performance, this paper constructs a "risk-behavior" analysis framework and utilizes environmental governance data for empirical testing. This paper uses the dynamic panel data to determine causality, and the study found that the degree of capture only has a weakened regulatory effect on the severity of the impact, while certainty no longer has the policy effect of reducing pollution. In order to clarify the mechanism of causality, this article uses the “theoretical least-likely case” for its supplementary analysis. In the case the level of capture is low, after being caught, law enforcement officials will prioritize to control certainty. Thus, certainty becomes invalid. As the degree of capture increases, this preference would become more apparent. Perception of risk is the core factor that determines the behavior of both parties of the capture. To maintain the stability of the transaction structure, when enterprises choose to reduce risks by reducing emissions, severity is still an effective regulatory tool. When enterprises choose to reduce risks by increasing the level of capture, severity no longer works. This paper demonstrates the mechanism of how capture makes heavy pollution control ineffective and its consequences. It provides theoretical guidance for improving the efficiency of environmental supervision, especially improving the efficiency of environmental inspectors.