Fiscal consolidation is the major measure of government debt risk emergency management in most countries. It is trigged on the case that the debt risk level is over some standard or there is a debt default event. In 2016, China published its fiscal reconsolidation policy for local governments. Based on the “control rights”model, this paper puts forward four types of governance structures, and investigates the behavior and differences of grass-roots governments fiscal consolidation in different governance structures. By applying the multi-case study method of DSO paradigm, this paper studies four counties (districts) with excessive debt risk and finds that when the debt risk index exceeded the standard and needed to reduce, the county-level governments in the “highly-centralized” and “incentive association” governance structure adopted the measures specified in the policy, which belongs to "programmatic response". The county-level government, which is in the “administrative subcontract” and “loosely association” governance structure, worked with the municipal governments to find ways beyond the policies to have "flexible response". In addition, this paper finds that after the termination of fiscal consolidation, the debt burden ratio, land transfer yields and transfer payments obtained from municipal governments of some counties increased, indicating that the constraints of fiscal consolidation in China could not effectively control the debt risk and promote the sustainability of local finance. This study enriches the research on public finance management of local governments from the perspective of organization, and provides forwards valuable policy suggestions for improving debt risk control of China’s local governments.