During the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy, China introduced individual accounts and established a basic pension insurance system for employees that combines social pooling with individual accounts. The pursuit of incentives and efficiency is the core concept of this decision. In theory, the incentive mechanism for basic pension insurance is mainly achieved through institutional structure and operational mechanisms. The incentive intensity of the current system is already high enough and the incentive width is wide enough, but more than 20 years of practice have proven that the incentive effect of the system has not been demonstrated, and the constraint force is clearly insufficient. This is not only related to the subjective reasons of individual rationality but also deeply influenced by the objective conditions of China's economic and social development stage. From international experience, when public pension funds are in crisis, abandoning parameter reform plans and choosing privatization may seem like a shortcut, but in reality, it is a wrong path. Incentives are not the only goal, or even the main goal, of the development of the basic pension insurance system. The incentive effect that individual accounts can achieve can also be achieved through social insurance, and the key lies in institutional design rather than institutional models. Due to the fact that strengthening incentives inevitably undermines fairness, a mandatory social insurance system should not overly emphasize incentive mechanisms, but should prioritize constraint mechanisms that reflect legal obligations. From a practical perspective in China, the trend factors of population ageing, historical factors of introducing individual accounts, and institutional factors with insufficient parameter constraints jointly lead to financial unsustainable risks in the operation of the system, and also result in an 

imbalance in the structure of the multi-pillar pension system. The prominent problem of China's basic pension insurance system is not insufficient incentives but insufficient constraints. The tools for parameter reform are far from exhausted, and it is not advisable to use the name of "incentives" to expand the size of individual accounts. In terms of reform suggestions, the basic pension insurance system should separate social pooling and individual accounts and return to the pay-as-you-go model; Strengthen legal obligations and constraint mechanisms, and achieve moderate incentive functions by improving the pension calculation methods; On the basis of improving the basic pension insurance system, we will orderly develop voluntary cumulative pension plans.

在从由计划经济向社会主义市场经济转型时期,中国引入个人账户、建立起了社会统筹与个人账户相结合的基本养老保险制度,对激励和效率的追求则是这一决策的核心理念。从理论层面看,基本养老保险激励机制主要通过制度结构和运行机制得以实现。现行制度的激励强度已足够高、激励宽度已足够广,但是20多年的实践证明,激励效果并未显现,约束力度反而明显不足。这既与个体理性的主观因素相关,也深受中国经济社会发展阶段客观条件的影响。从国际经验看,当公共养老金遭遇危机时,放弃参数改革方案而选择私有化途径,看似捷径,实则歧途。激励并非基本养老保险制度发展的唯一目标,甚至不是主要目标。个人账户能够实现的激励作用,社会统筹同样可以实现,关键在于制度设计而非制度模式。由于强化激励势必有损公平,因此,强制性的社会保险制度不宜过分强调激励机制,而是应将体现法定义务的约束机制放在首位。从中国实际看,人口老龄化的趋势性因素、引入个人账户的历史性因素和参数约束不足的制度性因素等共同导致制度运行面临财务不可持续风险,也造成多支柱养老金体系结构失衡。基本养老保险制度当前的突出问题不是激励不够,而是约束不足;参量改革的工具远未用尽,更不应借以 “激励”之名扩大个人账户规模。改革建议方面,基本养老保险制度应当实行统账分离、回归现收现付模式;强化法定义务和约束机制,通过完善待遇计发办法实现适度激励功能;在完善基本养老保险制度的基础上,有序发展自愿性的积累型养老金计划。